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Abstract—Solid-state drives (SSDs) have been widely de-
ployed in desktops and data centers. However, SSDs suffer
from bit errors, and the bit error rate is time dependent
since it increases as an SSD wears down. Traditional storage
systems mainly use parity-based RAID to provide reliability
guarantees by striping redundancy across multiple devices, but
the effectiveness of RAID in SSDs remains debatable as parity
updates aggravate the wearing and bit error rates of SSDs.
In particular, an open problem is that how different parity
distributions over multiple devices, such as the even distribu-
tion suggested by conventional wisdom, or uneven distributions
proposed in recent RAID schemes for SSDs, may influence the
reliability of an SSD RAID array. To address this fundamental
problem, we propose the first analytical model to quantify the
reliability dynamics of an SSD RAID array. Specifically, we
develop a “non-homogeneous” continuous time Markov chain
model, and derive the transient reliability solution. We validate
our model via trace-driven simulations and conduct numerical
analysis to provide insights into the reliability dynamics of SSD
RAID arrays under different parity distributions and subject
to different bit error rates and array configurations. Designers
can use our model to decide the appropriate parity distribution
based on their reliability requirements.
Keywords-Solid-state Drives; RAID; Reliability; CTMC;
Transient Analysis
I. Introduction
Solid-state drives (SSDs) emerge to be the next-generation
storage medium. Today’s SSDs mostly build on NAND flash
memories, and provide several design enhancements over
hard disks including higher I/O performance, lower energy
consumption, and higher shock resistance. As SSDs continue
to see price drops nowadays, they have been widely deployed
in desktops and large-scale data centers [10], [14].
However, even though enterprise SSDs generally provide
high reliability guarantees (e.g., with mean-time-between-
failures of 2 million hours [17]), they are susceptible to
wear-outs and bit errors. First, SSDs regularly perform erase
operations between writes, yet they can only tolerate a
limited number of erase cycles before wearing out. For
example, the erasure limit is only 10K for multi-level cell
(MLC) SSDs [5], and even drops to several hundred for the
latest triple-level cell (TLC) SSDs [13]. Also, bit errors are
common in SSDs due to read disturbs, program disturbs, and
retention errors [12], [13], [27]. Although in practice SSDs
use error correction codes (ECCs) to protect data [8], [26],
the protection is limited since the bit error rate increases as
SSDs issue more erase operations [12], [27]. We call a post-
ECC bit error an uncorrectable bit error. Furthermore, bit
errors become more severe when the density of flash cells
increases and the feature size decreases [13]. Thus, SSD
reliability remains a legitimate concern, especially when an
SSD issues frequent erase operations due to heavy writes.
RAID (redundant array of independent disks) [31] pro-
vides an option to improve reliability of SSDs. Using parity-
based RAID (e.g., RAID-4, RAID-5), the original data is
encoded into parities, and the data and parities are striped
across multiple SSDs to provide storage redundancy against
failures. RAID has been widely used in tolerating hard
disk failures, and conventional wisdom suggests that parities
should be evenly distributed across multiple drives so as
to achieve better load balancing, e.g., RAID-5. However,
traditional RAID introduces a different reliability problem
to SSDs since parities are updated for every data write and
this aggravates the erase cycles. To address this problem,
authors in [2] propose a RAID scheme called Diff-RAID
which aims to enhance the SSD RAID reliability by keeping
uneven parity distributions. Other studies (e.g., [16], [20]–
[22], [25], [30]) also explore the use of RAID in SSDs.
However, there remain open issues on the proper architec-
ture designs of highly reliable SSD RAID [19]. One specific
open problem is how different parity distributions generally
influence the reliability of an SSD RAID array subject to
different error rates and array configurations. In other words,
should we distribute parities evenly or unevenly across
multiple SSDs with respect to the SSD RAID reliability?
This motivates us to characterize the SSD RAID reliability
using analytical modeling, which enables us to readily tune
different input parameters and determine their impacts on
reliability. However, analyzing the SSD RAID reliability is
challenging, as the error rates of SSDs are time-varying.
Specifically, unlike hard disk drives in which error arrivals
are commonly modeled as a constant-rate Poisson process
(e.g., see [28], [33]), SSDs have an increasing error arrival
rate as they wear down with more erase operations.
In this paper, we formulate a continuous time Markov
chain (CTMC) model to analyze the effects of different
parity placement strategies, such as traditional RAID-5 and
Diff-RAID [2], on the reliability dynamics of an SSD RAID
array. To capture the time-varying bit error rates in SSDs, we
formulate a non-homogeneous CTMC model, and conduct
transient analysis to derive the system reliability at any
specific time instant. To our knowledge, this is the first
analytical study on the reliability of an SSD RAID array.
In summary, this paper makes two key contributions:
• We formulate a non-homogeneous CTMC model to
characterize the reliability dynamics of an SSD RAID
array. We use the uniformization technique [7], [18],
[32] to derive the transient reliability of the array.
Since the state space of our model increases with
the SSD size, we develop optimization techniques to
reduce the computational cost of transient analysis. We
also quantify the corresponding error bounds of the
uniformization and optimization techniques. Using the
SSD simulator [1], we validate our model via trace-
driven simulations.
• We conduct extensive numerical analysis to compare
the reliability of an SSD RAID array under RAID-5
and Diff-RAID [2]. We observe that Diff-RAID, which
places parities unevenly across SSDs, only improves
the reliability over RAID-5 when the error rate is not
too large, while RAID-5 is reliable enough if the error
rate is sufficiently small. On the other hand, when the
error rate is very large, neither RAID-5 nor Diff-RAID
can provide high reliability, so increasing fault tolerance
(e.g., RAID-6 or a stronger ECC) becomes necessary.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II,
we formulate our model that characterizes the reliability
dynamics of an SSD RAID array, and formally define the
reliability metric. In Section III, we derive the transient
system state using uniformization and some optimization
techiniques. In Section IV, we validate our model via trace-
driven simulations. In Section V, we present numerical
analysis results on how different parity placement strategies
influence the RAID reliability. Section VI reviews related
work, and finally Section VII concludes.
II. System Model
It is well known that RAID-5 is effective in providing
single-fault tolerance for traditional hard disk storage. It
distributes parities evenly across all drives and achieves
load balancing. Recently, Balakrishnan et al. [2] report that
RAID-5 may result in correlated failures, and hence poor
reliability, for SSD RAID arrays if SSDs are worn out
at the same time. Thus, they propose a modified RAID
scheme called Diff-RAID for SSDs. Diff-RAID improves
RAID-5 through (i) distributing parties unevenly and (ii)
redistributing parities each time when a worn-out SSD is
replaced so that the oldest SSD always has the most parities
and wears out first. However, it remains unclear whether
Diff-RAID (or placing parities unevenly across drives) really
improves the reliability of SSD RAID over RAID-5 in all
error patterns, as there is a lack of comprehensive studies on
the reliability dynamics of SSD RAID arrays under different
parity distributions.
In this section, we first formulate an SSD RAID array,
then characterize the age of each SSD based on the age of the
array (we will formally define the concept of age in later part
of this section). Lastly, we model the error rate based on the
age of each SSD, and formulate a non-homogeneous CTMC
to characterize the reliability dynamics of an SSD RAID
array under various parity distributions, including different
parity placement distributions like RAID-5 or Diff-RAID.
Table I lists the major notations used in this paper.
Specific Notations of SSD
M : Erasure limit of each block (e.g., 10K)
B : Total number of blocks in each SSD
λi(t) : Error rate of a chunk in SSD i at time t
Specific Notations of RAID Array
N : Number of data drives (i.e., an array has N + 1 SSDs)
S : Total number of stripes in an SSD RAID array
pi : Fraction of parity chunks in SSD i, and
∑N
i=0 pi = 1
k : Total number of erasures performed on SSD RAID array
(i.e., system age of the array)
ki : Number of erasures performed on each block of SSD i
(i.e., age of SSD i)
T : Average inter-arrival time of two consecutive erasure
operations on SSD RAID array
πj(t) : Probability that the array has j stripes that contain
exactly one erroneous chunk each, (0 ≤ j ≤ S)
πS+1(t): Probability that at least one stripe of the array contains
more than one erroneous chunk, so
∑S+1
j=0 πj(t) = 1
R(t) : Reliability at time t, i.e., probability that no data loss
happens until time t, R(t) =
∑S
j=0 πj(t)
Table I: Notations.
A. SSD RAID Formulations
An SSD is usually organized in blocks, each of which
typically contains 64 or 128 pages. Both read and program
(write) operations are performed in unit of pages, and each
page is of size 4KB. Data can only be programmed to clean
pages. SSDs use an erase operation, which is performed
in unit of blocks, to reset all pages in a block into clean
pages. To improve write performance, SSDs use out-of-place
writes, i.e., to update a page, the new data is programmed to
a clean page while the original page is marked as invalid. An
SSD is usually composed of multiple chips (or packages),
each containing thousands of blocks. Chips are independent
of each other and can operate in parallel. We refer readers
to [1] for a detailed description about the SSD organization.
We now describe the organization of an SSD RAID array
that we consider, as shown in Figure 1. We consider the
device-level RAID organization where the array is composed
of N+1 SSDs numbered from 0 to N . In this paper, we
address the case where the array is tolerable against a single
SSD failure, as assumed in traditional RAID-4, RAID-5
schemes and the modified RAID schemes for SSDs [2], [16],
[20]–[22], [25], [30]. Each SSD is divided into multiple non-
overlapping chunks, each of which can be mapped to one
or multiple physical pages. The array is further divided into
stripes, each of which is a collection of N +1 chunks from
the N + 1 SSDs. Within a stripe, there are N data chunks,
and one parity chunk encoded from the N data chunks.
Figure 1: Organization of an SSD RAID array.
We call a chunk an erroneous chunk when uncorrectable bit
errors appear in that chunk; or a correct chunk otherwise.
Since we focus on single-fault tolerance, we require that
each stripe contains at most one erroneous chunk without
data loss so that it can be recovered from other surviving
chunks in the same stripe.
Suppose that each SSD contains B blocks, and the array
contains S stripes (i.e., S chunks per SSD). For simplicity,
we assume that all S stripes are used for data storage.
To generalize our analysis, we organize parity chunks in
the array according to some probability distribution. We let
SSD i contain a fraction pi of parity chunks. In the special
case of RAID-5, parity chunks are evenly placed across all
devices, so pi = 1N+1 for all i if the array consists of N+1
drives. For Diff-RAID, pi’s do not need to be equal to 1N+1 ,
but only need to satisfy the condition of
∑N
i=0 pi = 1.
Each block in an SSD can only sustain a limited number
of erase cycles, and is supposed to be worn out after the
limit. We denote the erasure limit by M , which corresponds
to the lifetime of a block. To enhance the durability of SSDs,
efficient wear-leveling techniques are often used to balance
the number of erasures across all blocks. In this paper, we
assume that each SSD achieves perfect wear-leveling such
that every block has exactly the same number of erasures.
Let ki (≤ M ) be the number of erasures that have been
performed on each block in SSD i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ N . We
denote ki as the age of each block in SSD i, or equivalently,
the age of SSD i when perfect wear-leveling is assumed.
When an SSD reaches its erasure limit, we assume that it
is replaced by a new SSD. For simplicity, we treat ki as
a continuous value in [0,M ]. Let k be the total number of
erase operations that the whole array has processed, and we
call k the system age of the array.
B. SSD Age Characterization
In this subsection, we proceed to characterize the age
of each SSD for a given RAID scheme. In particular, we
derive ki, denoting the age of SSD i, when the whole array
has already performed a total of k erase operations. This
characterization enables us to model the error rate in each
SSD accurately (see Section II-C). We focus on two RAID
schemes: traditional RAID and Diff-RAID [2].
We first quantify the aging rate of each SSD in an array.
Let ri be the aging rate of SSD i. Note that for each stripe,
updating a data chunk also has the parity chunk updated.
Suppose that each data chunk has the same probability of
being accessed. On average, the ratio of the aging rate of
SSD i to that of SSD j can be expressed as [2]:
ri
rj
=
piN + (1 − pi)
pjN + (1 − pj)
. (1)
Equation (1) states that the parity chunk ages N times faster
than each data chunk. Given the aging rates ri’s, we can
quantify the probability of SSD i being the target drive for
each erase operation, which we denote by qi. We model qi
by making it proportional to the aging rate of SSD i, i.e.,
qi =
ri∑N
i=0 ri
=
piN + (1− pi)∑N
i=0(piN + (1− pi))
. (2)
We now characterize the age of Diff-RAID which places
parities unevenly and redistributes parity chunks after the
worn-out SSD is replaced so as to maintain the age ratios
and always wear out the oldest SSD first. To mathematically
characterize the system age of Diff-RAID, define Ai as the
remaining fraction of erasures that SSD i can sustain right
after an SSD replacement. Clearly, Ai = 1 for a brand-
new drive and Ai = 0 for a worn-out drive. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the drives are sorted by Ai
in descending order, i.e., A0 ≥ A1 ≥ · · · ≥ AN , and we
have A0 = 1 as it is the newly replaced drive. Diff-RAID
performs parity redistribution to guarantee that the aging
ratio in Equation (1) remains unchanged. Therefore, the
remaining fraction of erasures for each drive will converge,
and the values of Ai’s in the steady state are given by [2]:
Ai=
∑N
j=i rj∑N
j=0 rj
=
∑N
j=i(pjN+(1−pj))∑N
j=0(pjN+(1−pj))
, 0≤ i≤N. (3)
In this paper, we study Diff-RAID after the age distribution
of SSDs right after each drive replacement converges, i.e.,
the initial remaining fractions of erasures of SSDs in Diff-
RAID follow the distribution of Ai’s in Equation (3).
We now characterize ki for Diff-RAID. Recall that each
SSD has B blocks. Due to perfect wear-leveling, every block
of SSD i has the same probability qi/B of being the target
block for an erase operation. Thus, if the array has processed
k erase operations, the age of SSD i is:
Diff-RAID: ki =
(kqi
B
mod qi
qN
(M−kN0)
)
+ki0, (4)
where ki0 = M(1−Ai) is the initial number of times
that each block of SSD i has been erased right after a
drive replacement, and the notation mod denotes the modulo
operation. The rationale of Equation (4) is as follows. Since
we sort the SSDs by Ai in descending order, SSD N always
has the highest aging rate and will be replaced first. Thus,
after each block of SSD N has performed (M − kN0)
erasures, SSD N will be replaced, and each block of SSD i
has just been erased qi
qN
(M − kN0) times. Therefore, for
SSD i, a drive replacement happens when each block has
been erased every qi
qN
(M−kN0) times. Moreover, the initial
number of erasures on each block of SSD i right after a
drive replacement is ki0. Thus, the age of SSD i is derived
as in Equation (4). Since ki0 = M(1−Ai) and AN = qN ,
Equation (4) can be rewritten as:
Diff-RAID: ki = ((kqi/B) mod Mqi)+M(1−Ai). (5)
For traditional RAID (e.g., RAID-4 or RAID-5), parity
chunks are kept intact, and will not be redistributed after a
drive replacement. So after the array has performed k erase
operations, each block of SSD i has just performed kqi/B
erasures, and an SSD will be replaced every time when each
block performed M erasures. Thus, the age of SSD i is:
Traditional RAID: ki = (kqi/B) mod M. (6)
C. Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
We first model the error rate of an SSD. We assume that
the error arrival processes of different chunks in an SSD
are independent. Since different chunks in an SSD have the
same age, they must have the same error rate. We let λi(t)
represent the error rate of each chunk in SSD i at time t, and
model it as a function of the number of erasures on SSD i
at time t, which is denoted by ki(t) (the notation t may be
dropped if the context is clear). Furthermore, to reflect that
bit errors increase with the number of erasures, we model
the error rate based on a Weibull distribution [34], which
has been widely used in reliability engineering. Formally,
λi(t) = cα(ki(t))
α−1, α>1, (7)
where α is called the shape parameter and c is a constant.
Note that even if the error rates of SSDs are time-varying,
they only vary with the number of erasures on the SSDs. If
we let tk be the time point of the kth erasure on the array,
then during the period (tk, tk+1) (i.e., between the kth and
(k + 1)th erasures), the number of erasures on each SSD
is fixed, hence the error rates during this period should be
constant, and the error arrivals can be modeled as a Poisson
process. In particular, ki(t) = ki(k) if t ∈ (tk, tk+1), and
the function ki(k) is expressed by Equation (5) and (6).
We now formulate a CTMC model to characterize the
reliability dynamics of an SSD RAID array. Recall that the
array provides single-fault tolerance for each stripe. We say
that the CTMC is at state i if and only if the array has i
stripes that contain exactly one erroneous chunk each, where
0≤ i≤S. Data loss happens if any one stripe contains more
than one erroneous chunk, and we denote this state by S+1.
Let X(t) be the system state at time t. Formally, we have
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Figure 2: State transition of the non-homogeneous CTMC.
X(t) ∈ {0, 1, ..., S+1}, ∀t ≥ 0. To derive the system state,
we let πj(t) be the probability that the CTMC is at state j at
time t (0≤j≤S+1), so the system state can be characterized
by the vector pi(t) = (π0(t), π1(t), ..., πS+1(t)).
Let us consider the transition of the CTMC. For each
stripe, if it contains one erroneous chunk, then the erroneous
chunk can be reconstructed from the other surviving chunks
in the same stripe. Assume that only one stripe can be
reconstructed at a time, and that the reconstruction time
follows an exponential distribution with rate µ. The state
transition diagram of the CTMC is depicted in Figure 2. To
elaborate, suppose that the RAID array is currently at state
j, if an erroneous chunk appears in one of the (S−j) stripes
that originally have no erroneous chunk, then it will move to
state j+1 with rate (S−j)
∑N
i=0 λi(t); if an erroneous chunk
appears in one of the j stripes that already have another
erroneous chunk, then the system will move to state S+1
(in which data loss occurs) with rate j∑Ni=0 λi(t).
We now define the reliability of an SSD RAID array at
time t, and denote it by R(t). Formally, it is the probability
that no stripe has encountered data loss until time t.
R(t) =
∑S
j=0
πj(t). (8)
Note that our model captures the time-varying nature of
reliability over the lifespan of the SSD RAID array. Next,
we show how to analyze this non-homogeneous CTMC.
III. Transient Analysis of CTMC
In this section, we derive pi(t), the system state of an
SSD RAID array at any time t. Once we have pi(t), we can
then compute the instantaneous reliability R(t) according to
Equation (8). There are two major challenges in deriving
pi(t). First, it involves transient analysis, which is different
from the conventional steady state Markov chain analysis.
Second, the underlying CTMC {X(t), t ≥ 0} is non-
homogeneous, as the error arrival rate λi(t) is time varying,
and it also has a very large state space.
In the following, we first present the mathematical foun-
dation on analyzing the non-homogeneous CTMC so as
to compute the transient system state, then formalize an
algorithm based on the mathematical analysis. At last, we
develop an optimization technique to address the challenge
of large state space of the CTMC so as to further reduce the
computational cost of the algorithm.
A. Mathematical Analysis on the Non-homogeneous CTMC
Note that the error rates of SSDs within a period (tk, tk+1)
(k = 0, 1, 2, ...) are constant, so if we only focus on a partic-
ular time period of the CTMC, i.e., {X(t), tk < t ≤ tk+1},
then it becomes a time-homogeneous CTMC. Therefore, the
intuitive way to derive the transient solution of the CTMC
{X(t), t ≥ 0} is to divide it into many time-homogeneous
CTMCs {X(t), tk < t ≤ tk+1} (k = 0, 1, 2...), then use
the uniformization technique [7], [18], [32] to analyze these
time-homogeneous CTMCs one by one in time ascending
order. Specifically, to derive pi(tk+1), one first derives pi(t1)
from the initial state pi(0), then takes pi(t1) as the initial
state and derives pi(t2) from pi(t1) and so on.
However, this computational approach may take a pro-
hibitively long time to derive pi(tk+1) when k is very large,
which usually occurs in SSDs. Since k denotes the number
of erasures performed on an SSD RAID array, it can grow
up to (N+1)BM , where both B (the number of blocks in
an SSD) and M (the erasure limit) could be very huge, say,
100K and 10K, respectively (see Sec. V). Therefore, simply
applying the uniformization technique is computationally
infeasible to derive the reliability of an SSD RAID array,
especially when the array performs a lot of erasures.
To overcome the above challenge, we propose an opti-
mization technique which combines multiple time periods
together. The main idea is that since the difference of the
generator matrices at two consecutive periods is very small
in general, we consider s consecutive periods together, where
s is called the step size. For simplicity of discussion, let T
be the average inter-arrival time of two consecutive erasure
operations, i.e., tk = kT . To analyze the non-homogeneous
CTMC over s periods {X(t), lsT < t ≤ (l + 1)sT }
(l = 0, 1, ...), we define another time-homogeneous CTMC
{X˜(t), lsT < t ≤ (l+1)sT } to approximate it and also
quantify the error bound. The derivation of pi((l+1)sT )
given pi(lsT ) proceeds as follows.
Step 1: Constructing a time-homogeneous CTMC
{X˜(t), lsT < t ≤ (l+1)sT } with generator matrix Q˜l.
Note that there are s periods in the interval (lsT, (l+1)sT ).
We denote the generator matrices of the original Markov
chain {X(t)} during each of the s periods by Qls, Qls+1,
... , Q(l+1)s−1. To construct {X˜(t), lsT < t ≤ (l + 1)sT },
we define Q˜l as a function of the s generator matrices.
Q˜l = f(Qls,Qls+1, ...,Q(l+1)s−1), l = 0, 1, ... (9)
Intuitively, Q˜l can be viewed as the “average” over the
s generator matrices. To illustrate, consider a special case
where α in Equation (7) is set to be α = 2. Then the error
arrival rate of each chunk of SSD i becomes 2cki. In this
case, each element of the generator matrix Qk becomes
qi,j(k)=


−SΣ, i= j=0,
−µ−SΣ, 0<i≤S, j= i,
(S−i)Σ, 0≤ i<S, j= i+1,
iΣ, 0<i≤S, j=S+1,
µ, 0<i≤S, j = i−1,
0, otherwise ,
(10)
where Σ =
∑N
i=02cki and ki is computed by Equations (5)
and (6). Now, for the Markov chain X˜(t), we let Q˜l be an
average of these s generator matrices Qk. Mathematically,
Q˜l =
(∑(l+1)s−1
k=ls
Qk
)
/s, l = 0, 1, ... (11)
Note that our analysis is applicable for other values of
α, with different choices of defining Q˜l in Equation (9)
and different error bounds. We pose the further analysis
of different values of α as future work. In the following
discussion, we fix α = 2, whose error bound can be derived.
Step 2: Deriving the system state p˜i((l+1)sT ) under the
time-homogeneous CTMC {X˜(t)}. To derive the system
state at time (l+1)sT , which we denote as p˜i((l+1)sT ), we
solve the Kolmogorov’s forward equation and we have
p˜i((l+1)sT )=p˜i(lsT )
∑∞
n=0
(Q˜lsT )
n/n!, l = 0, 1, ... (12)
where the initial state is p˜i(0) = pi(0).
Step 3: Applying uniformization to solve Equation (12).
We let Λ˜l ≥ maxls≤k≤(l+1)s−1 max0≤i≤S+1 |−qi,i(k)|, and
let P˜ l = I+ Q˜lΛ˜l . Based on the uniformization technique [7],
the system state at time (l+1)sT can be derived as follows.
p˜i((l+1)sT )=
∑∞
n=0
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
vl(n), l=0, 1, ... (13)
where vl(n) = vl(n−1)P˜ l and vl(0) = p˜i(lsT ). The initial
state is p˜i(0) = pi(0).
Step 4: Truncating the infinite summation in Equa-
tion (13) with a quantifiable error bound. We denote
the truncation point for interval (lsT, (l+1)sT ) by Ul and
denote the system state at time (l+1)sT after truncation by
ˆ˜pi((l+1)sT ). We also denote the error caused by combining s
periods together and truncating the infinite series in interval
(lsT, (l+1)sT ) by ˆ˜ǫl||ˆ˜pi((l+1)sT )−pi((l+1)sT )||1, where
pi((l+ 1)sT ) denotes the accurate system state obtained
by iteratively analyzing the time-homogeneous CTMCs
{X(t), kT < t ≤ (k + 1)T } (k = 0, 1, ..., (l+1)s − 1)
from the initial state pi(0). Now, ˆ˜pi((l+1)sT ) and ˆ˜ǫl can be
computed using the following theorem.
Theorem 1: After truncating the infinite series, the system
state at time (l + 1)sT for the Markov chain {X˜(t)} with
step size s can be computed as follows.
ˆ˜pi((l+1)sT )=
∑Ul
n=0
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
vl(n), l=0, 1, ... (14)
where vl(n) = vl(n−1)P˜ l and vl(0) = ˆ˜pi(lsT ). The initial
state is ˆ˜pi(0) = pi(0). The error is bounded as follows.
ˆ˜ǫl≤ ˆ˜ǫl−1+
(
1−
∑Ul
n=0
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
)
, l=0, 1, ... (15)
where ˆ˜ǫ0 = ||ˆ˜pi(0)− pi(0)||1 = 0.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix.
B. Algorithm for Computing System State
In the last subsection, we present the mathematical foun-
dation on computing the system state of SSD RAID arrays
and the corresponding error bounds. We now present the
algorithm to compute ˆ˜pi(t) according to Theorem 1. In
particular, we aim to compute the system state at the time
when the kth erasure operation has just occurred, i.e.,
ˆ˜pi(kT ). Without loss of generality, we assume that k is an
integer multiple of the step size s. Moreover, we denote the
maximum acceptable error by ǫ.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Computing System State ˆ˜pi(kT )
Input: Step size s, maximum error ǫ and initial state ˆ˜pi(0) = pi(0)
Output: System state at time kT : ˆ˜pi(kT )
1: for l = 0→ k
s
− 1 do
2: Let Q˜l =
∑(l+1)s−1
m=ls
Qm
s
;
3: Choose Λ˜l ≥ maxls≤m<(l+1)smax0≤i≤S+1 | − qi,i(m)|;
4: Let P˜ l = I + Q˜lΛ˜l ;
5: Initialize: ˆ˜ǫl ← 0; n ← 0; ˆ˜pi((l + 1)sT ) ← 0; vl(0) ←
ˆ˜pi(lsT );
6: while 1− ˆ˜ǫl > sǫk do
7: ˆ˜ǫl ← ˆ˜ǫl + e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
;
8: ˆ˜pi((l+1)sT )← ˆ˜pi((l+1)sT )+ e−Λ˜lsT (Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
vl(n);
9: n← n+ 1;
10: vl(n)← vl(n− 1)P˜ l;
11: end while
12: end for
Algorithm 1 describes the pseudo-code of the algorithm.
Lines 2 to 11 are to derive the system state in one interval
with s time periods based on the flow in Section III-A.
In particular, Line 2 constructs the generator matrix of our
defined CTMC {X˜(t)}. Lines 3 to 5 initialize the necessary
parameters. Lines 6 to 11 implement Equation (14), while
the truncation point is determined based on Equation (15)
and the given maximum error. Note that the condition in
Line 6 indicates that the maximum allowable error in one
interval is sǫ
k
, as there are k
s
intervals and the aggregate
maximum allowable error is ǫ. After computing the system
state at time kT using Algorithm 1, we can easily compute
the RAID reliability based on the definition in Equation (8).
Our implementation of Algorithm 1 uses the following
inputs. We fix s = BM/20, meaning that for each SSD, we
consider at least 20 time points before it reaches its lifetime
of BM erasures. The error bound is fixed at ǫ = 10−3. We
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Figure 3: State transition after truncation.
also set π0(0) = 1 and πj(0) = 0 for 0 < j ≤ S + 1 to
indicate that the array has no erroneous chunk initially.
Note that the dimension of the matrix P˜ l is (S + 2) ×
(S + 2) (S is the number of stripes), which could be very
large for large SSDs. To further speed up our computation,
we develop another optimization technique by truncating
the states with large state numbers from the CTMC so
as to reduce the dimension of P˜ l. Intuitively, if an array
contains many stripes with exactly one erroneous chunk, it
is more likely that a new erroneous chunk appears in one
of such stripes (and hence data loss occurs) rather than in
a stripe without any erroneous chunk. That is, the transition
rate qi,i+1 becomes very small when i is large. We can
thus remove such states with large state numbers without
losing accuracy. We present the details of the optimization
technique in the next subsection.
C. Reducing Computational Cost of Algorithm 1
Note that when state number i increases, the transition
rate qi,i+1(k) decreases while the transition rate qi,S+1(k)
increases. This indicates that the higher the current state
number is, the harder it is to transit to states with larger
state number, while it is easier to transit to the state of data
loss, or state S+1. The physical meaning is that the system
will not contain too many stripes with exactly one erroneous
chunk as either the erroneous chunk will be recovered, or
another error may appear in the same stripe so that data
loss happens. Therefore, to reduce the computational cost
when derive the system state, we can truncate the states
with large state number so as to reduce the state space of
the Markov chain. Specifically, we truncate the states with
state number bigger than E, and let E+1 represents the case
when more than E stripes contain exactly one erroneous
chunk. Moreover, we take state E+1 as an absorbing state.
Furthermore, we denote the state of data loss by E+2. Now,
the state transition can be illustrated in Figure 3.
To compute the system state after states truncation, we
denote the new CTMC by {X¯(t), t ≥ 0}, the new generator
matrix during period (kT, (k+1)T ) by Q¯k, and the system
state at time (k+1)T by p¯i((k+1)T ). We use notations with
a bar to represent the case when system states of the CTMC
are truncated if the context is clear. Similar to Equation (12),
given the initial state p¯i(kT ), the system state at time (k +
1)T for the CTMC {X¯(t), t ≥ 0} can be derived as follows.
p¯i((k + 1)T ) = p¯i(kT )
∞∑
n=0
(Q¯kT )
n
n!
. (16)
If we denote the error caused by truncating the states at time
kT by ǫ¯k, then ǫ¯k can be formally defined as follows.
ǫ¯k = max
0≤i≤E
|π¯i(kT )− πi(kT )|,
where π¯i(kT ) represents the probability of system being at
state i at time kT for the CTMC {X¯(t), t ≥ 0}, i.e., the
Markov chain after states truncation, and πi(kT ) represents
the probability of the system being at state i at time kT for
the original CTMC {X(t), t ≥ 0}. Clearly, ǫ¯0 = 0 as the
two Markov chains have the same initial states, i.e., π¯i(0) =
πi(0). The bound of the error caused by states truncation is
ǫ¯k ≤ π¯E+1(kT ). (17)
Again, we can also follow the steps in Section III-A, i.e.,
use Algorithm 1, to compute the system state for the Markov
chain after states truncation {X¯(t), t≥0}.
IV. Model Validation
In this section, we validate via trace-driven simulation
the accuracy of our CTMC model on quantifying the RAID
reliability R(t). We use the Microsoft’s SSD simulator [1]
based on DiskSim [3]. Since each SSD contains multiple
chips that can be configured to be independent of each other
and handle I/O requests in parallel, we consider RAID at
the chip level (as opposed to device level) in our DiskSim
simulation. Specifically, we configure each chip to have its
own data bus and control bus and treat it as one drive, and
also treat the SSD controller as the RAID controller where
parity-based RAID is built.
To simulate error arrivals, we generate error events based
on Poisson arrivals given the current system age k of the
array. As the array ages, we update the error arrival rates
accordingly by varying the variable ki(t) in Equation (7). We
also generate recovery events whose recovery times follow
an exponential distribution with a fixed rate µ = 1. Both
error and recovery events are fed into the SSD simulator as
special types of I/O requests. We consider three cases: error
dominant, comparable, and recovery dominant, in which the
error rate is larger than, comparable to, and smaller than the
recovery rate, respectively.
Our validation measures the reliability of the traditional
RAID and Diff-RAID with different parity distributions.
Recall that Diff-RAID redistributes the parities after each
drive replacement, while traditional RAID does not. We
consider (N + 1) chips where N = 3, 5, 7. For traditional
RAID, we choose RAID-5, in which parity chunks are
evenly placed across the chips; for Diff-RAID, 10% of parity
chunks placed in each of the N chips and the remaining
parity chunks are placed in the last flash chip.
We generate synthetic uniform workload in which the
write requests access the addresses of the entire address
space with equal probability. The workload lasts until all
drives are worn out and replaced at least once. We run
the DiskSim simulation 1000 times, and in each run we
record the age when data loss happens. Finally, we derive
the probability of data loss and the reliability based on
our definitions. To speed up our DiskSim simulation, we
consider a small-scale RAID array, in which each chip
contains 80 blocks with 64 pages each, and the chunk size
is set to be the same as the page size 4KB. We also set a
low erasure limit at M = 100 cycles for each block.
Figure 4 shows the reliability R(t) versus the system age
k obtained from both the model and DiskSim results. We
observe that our model accurately quantifies the reliability
for all cases. Also, Diff-RAID shows its benefit only in
the comparable case. In the error dominant case, traditional
RAID always shows higher reliability than Diff-RAID; in
the recovery dominant case, there is no significant difference
between traditional RAID and Diff-RAID. We will further
discuss these findings in Section V.
V. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we conduct numerical analysis on the
reliability dynamics of a large-scale SSD RAID array with
respect to different parity placement strategies. To this end,
we summarize the lessons learned from our analysis.
A. Choices of Default Model Parameters
We first describe the default model parameters used in our
analysis, and provide justifications for our choices.
We consider an SSD RAID array composed of N + 1
SSDs, each being modeled by the same set of parameters. By
default, we set N = 9. Each block of an SSD has 64 pages of
size 4KB each. We consider 32GB SSDs with B = 131, 072
blocks. We configure the chunk size equal to the block size,
i.e., there are S = B = 131, 072 chunks1. We also have
each block sustain M =10K erase cycles.
We now describe how we configure the error arrival rate,
i.e., λi = 2cki, by setting the constant c. We employ 4-bit
ECC protection per 512 bytes of data, the industry standard
for today’s MLC flash. Based on the uncorrectable bit error
rates (UBERs) calculated in [2], we choose the UBER in
the range [10−16, 10−18] when an SSD reaches its rated
lifetime (i.e., the erasure limit M is reached). Since we set
the chunk size to be equal to the block size, the probability
that a chunk contains at least one bit error is roughly in
the range of [2 × 10−10, 2× 10−12]. Based on the analysis
on real enterprise workload traces [29], an RAID array can
1In practice, SSDs are over-provisioned [1], so the actual number of
blocks (or chunks) that can be used for storage (i.e., S) should be smaller.
However, the key observations of our results here still hold.
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Figure 4: Model validation with respect to different values of N and different error rates.
have several hundred gigabytes of data being accessed per
day. If the write request rate is set as 1TB per day (i.e., 50
blocks per second), then the error arrival rate per chunk at
its rated lifetime (i.e., λi = 2cM ) is approximately in the
range [10−8, 10−10]. The corresponding parameter c is in
the range [0.5× 10−12, 0.5× 10−14].
For the error recovery rate µ, we note that the aggregate
error arrival rate when all N +1 drives are going to die out
is 2cMS(N +1). If N = 9, then the aggregate error arrival
rate is roughly in the range [10−2, 10−4]. We fix µ = 10−3.
We compare different cases when the error arrivals are
more dominant than error recoveries, and vice versa. We
consider three cases of error patterns: c = 1.1 × 10−13,
c = 0.4 × 10−13, and c = 0.1 × 10−13, which correspond
to the error dominant, comparable, and recovery dominant
cases, respectively. Specifically, when c = 0.4× 10−13, the
aggregate error arrival rate of the array when all SSDs reach
their rated lifetime is around 2cMS(N +1) ≈ 10−3 (where
N = 9, M =10K, and S = 131, 072).
We now configure T , the time interval between two
neighboring erase operations. Suppose that there are 1TB
of writes per day as described above. The inter-arrival time
of write requests is around 3× 10−4 seconds for 4KB page
size. Thus, the average time between two erase operations is
1.9× 10−2 seconds as an erase is triggered after writing 64
pages. In practice, each erase causes additional writes (i.e.,
write amplification [15]) as it moves data across blocks, so
T should be smaller. Here, we fix T = 10−2 seconds.
We compare the reliability dynamics of RAID-5 and
different variants of Diff-RAID. For RAID-5, each drive
holds a fraction 1
N+1 of parity chunks; for Diff-RAID, we
choose the parity distribution (i.e., pi’s for 0 ≤ i ≤ N ) based
on a truncated normal distribution. Specifically, we consider
a normal distribution N (N + 1, σ2) with mean N + 1,
and standard deviation σ, and let f be the corresponding
probability density function. We then choose pi’s as follows:
pi =
∫ i+1
i
f(x)dx∫ N+1
0
f(x)dx
, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. (18)
We can choose different distributions of pi by tuning the
parameter σ. Intuitively, the larger σ is, the more evenly pi’s
are distributed. We consider three cases: σ = 1, σ = 2, and
σ = 5. Suppose that N = 9. Then for σ = 1, SSD N and
SSD N−1 hold 68% and 27% of parity chunks, respectively;
for σ = 2, SSD N , SSD N − 1, and SSD N − 2 hold 38%,
30%, and 18% of parity chunks, respectively; for σ = 5, the
proportions of parity chunks range from 2.8% (in SSD 0)
to 16.6% (in SSD N ). After choosing pi’s, the age of each
block of SSD i (i.e., ki) can be computed via Equation (5).
B. Impact of Different Error Dynamics
We now show the numerical results of RAID reliability
based on the parameters described earlier. We assume that
drive replacement can be completed immediately after the
oldest SSD reaches its rated lifetime. When the oldest drive
is replaced, all its chunks (including any erroneous chunks)
are copied to the new drive. Thus, the reliability (or the
probability of no data loss) remains the same. We consider
three error cases: error dominant, comparable, and recovery
dominant cases, as described above.
Case 1: Error dominant case. Figure 5(a) first shows
the numerical results for the error dominant case. Initially,
RAID-5 achieves very good reliability as all drives are
brand-new. However, as SSDs wear down, the bit error rate
increases, and this makes the RAID reliability decrease very
quickly. In particular, the reliability drops to zero (i.e., data
loss always happen) when the array performs around 5×109
erasures. For Diff-RAID, the more evenly parity chunks
are distributed, the lower RAID reliability is. In the error
dominant case, since error arrival rate is much bigger than
the recovery rate, the RAID reliability drops to zero very
quickly no matter what parity placement strategy is used. We
note that Diff-RAID is less reliable than traditional RAID-
5 in the error dominant case. The reason is that for Diff-
RAID, the initial ages of SSDs when constructing the RAID
array are non-zero, but instead follow the convergent age
distribution (i.e., based on Ai’s in Equation (3)). When error
arrival rate is very large, the array suffers from low reliability
even if the array only performs small number of erasures.
However, for RAID-5, since it is always constructed by using
brand-new SSDs, it starts with a very high reliability.
Case 2: Comparable case. Figure 5(b) shows the results for
the comparable case. RAID-5 achieves very good reliability
initially, but decreases dramatically as the SSDs wear down.
Also, all drives wear down at the same rate, the reliability
of the array is about zero when all drives reach their erasure
limits, i.e., when the system age is around 1.3 × 1010
erasures. Diff-RAID shows different reliability dynamics.
Initially, Diff-RAID has less reliability than RAID-5, but
the drop rate of the reliability is much slower than that of
RAID-5 as SSDs wear down. The reason is that Diff-RAID
has uneven parity placement, SSDs are worn out at different
times and will be replaced one by one. When the worn-out
SSD is replaced, other SSDs perform fewer erase operations
and have small error rates. This prevents the whole array
suffering from a very large error rate as in RAID-5. Also,
the reliability is higher when the parity distribution is more
skewed (i.e., smaller σ), as also observed in [2].
Case 3: Recovery dominant case. Figure 5(c) shows the
results for the recovery dominant case. RAID-5 shows high
reliability in general. Between two replacements (which
happens every 1.3× 1010 erasures), its data loss probability
drops by within 3%. Its reliability drops slowly right after
each replacement, and its drop rate increases as it is close to
be worn out. Diff-RAID shows higher reliability than RAID-
5 in general, but the difference is small (e.g., less than 6%
between Diff-RAID for σ = 1 and RAID-5). Therefore, in
the recovery dominant scenario, we may deploy RAID-5
instead of Diff-RAID, as the latter introduces higher costs
in parity redistribution in each replacement and has smaller
I/O throughput due to load imbalance of parities.
C. Impact of Different Array Configurations
We further study via our model how different array config-
urations affect the RAID reliability. We focus on Diff-RAID
and generate the parity distribution pi’s with σ = 1. Our goal
is to validate the robustness of our model on characterizing
the reliability for different array configurations.
Impact of N . Figure 6(a) shows the impact of the RAID size
N . We fix other parameters as the same in the comparable
case, i.e., µ = 10−3, c = 0.4 × 10−13, and M = 104.
The larger the system size, the lower the RAID reliability.
Intuitively, the probability of having one more erroneous
chunk in a stripe increases with the stripe width (i.e., N+1).
Note that the reliability drop is significant when N increases.
For example, at 2.6×1010 erasures, the reliability drops from
0.7 to 0.2 when N increases from 9 to 19.
Impact of ECC. Figure 6(b) shows the impact of different
ECC lengths. We fix µ = 10−3, M = 104, and N = 9. We
also fix the raw bit error rate (RBER) as 1.3×10−6 [2], and
compute the uncorrectable bit error rate using the formulas
in [27]. Then as described in Section V-A, we derive c
for different ECCs that can correct 3, 4, 5 bits per 512
byte sector, and the corresponding values are 4.4 × 10−11,
4.7× 10−14, and 4.2× 10−17, respectively. We observe that
the RAID reliability drops to zero very quickly for 3-bit
ECC at around 105 erasures, while the RAID reliability
for 5-bit ECC starts to decrease until the array performs
1011 erasures. This shows that the RAID reliability heavily
depends on the reliability of each single SSD, or the ECC
length employed in each SSD.
Impact of M . Figure 6(c) shows the impact of the erasure
limit M , or the endurance of a single SSD, on the RAID
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Figure 5: Reliability dynamics of SSD arrays.
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Figure 6: Impact of different RAID configurations on the reliability.
reliability. We fix other parameters with µ = 10−3, N = 9
and c = 0.4× 10−13. We observe that when M decreases,
the RAID reliability increases. For example, at 1.3 × 1010
erasures, the RAID reliability increases from 0.85 to 0.99
when M decreases from 10K to 1K. Recall that the error
rates increase with the number of erasures in SSDs. We
now have the increase of bit error rates capped by the small
erasure limit. The trade-off is that the SSDs are worn out
and replaced more frequently with smaller M .
D. Discussion
Our results provide several insights into constructing
RAID for SSDs.
• The error dominant case may correspond to the low-end
MLC or TLC SSDs with high bit error rates, especially
when these types of SSDs have low I/O bandwidth
for RAID reconstruction. Both traditional RAID-5 and
Diff-RAID show low reliability. A higher degree of
fault tolerance (e.g., using RAID-6 or stronger ECC)
becomes necessary in this case.
• When the error arrival and recovery rates are similar,
Diff-RAID, with uneven parity distribution, achieves
higher reliability than RAID-5, especially when RAID-
5 reaches zero reliability when all SSDs are worn out
simultaneously. This conforms to the findings in [2].
• In the recovery dominant case, which may correspond
to the high-end single-level cell (SLC) SSDs that typi-
cally have very small bit error rates, RAID-5 achieves
very high reliability. We may choose RAID-5 over Diff-
RAID in RAID deployment to save the overhead of
parity redistribution in Diff-RAID.
• Our model can effectively analyze the RAID reliability
with regard to different RAID configurations.
VI. Related Work
There have been extensive studies on NAND flash-based
SSDs. A detailed survey of the algorithms and data struc-
tures for flash memories is found in [11]. Recent papers em-
pirically study the intrinsic characteristics of SSDs (e.g., [1],
[5]), or develop analytical models for the write performance
(e.g., [9], [15]) and garbage collection algorithms (e.g., [23])
of SSDs.
Bit error rates of SSDs are known to increase with the
number of erase cycles [12], [27]. To improve reliability,
prior studies propose to adopt RAID for SSDs at the device
level [2], [16], [21], [22], [25], [30], or at the chip level [20].
These studies focus on developing new RAID schemes that
improve the performance and endurance of SSDs over tra-
ditional RAID. The performance and reliability implications
of RAID on SSDs are also experimentally studied in [19]. In
contrast, our work focuses on quantifying reliability dynam-
ics of SSD RAID from a theoretical perspective. Authors
of Diff-RAID [2] also attempt to quantify the reliability,
but they only compute the reliability at the instants of SSD
replacements, while our model captures the time-varying
nature of error rates in SSDs and quantifies the instantaneous
reliability during the whole lifespan of an SSD RAID array.
RAID was first introduced in [31] and has been widely
used in many storage systems. Performance and reliability
analysis on RAID in the context of hard disk drives has
been extensively studied (e.g., see [4], [6], [24], [28], [35]).
On the other hand, SSDs have a distinct property that their
error rates increase as they wear down, so a new model is
necessary to characterize the reliability of SSD RAID.
VII. Conclusions
We develop the first analytical model that quantifies the re-
liability dynamics of SSD RAID arrays. We build our model
as a non-homogeneous continuous time Markov chain, and
use uniformization to analyze the transient state of the RAID
reliability. We validate the correctness of our model via
trace-driven DiskSim simulation with SSD extensions.
One major application of our model is to characterize the
reliability dynamics of general RAID schemes with different
parity placement distributions. To demonstrate, we compare
the reliability dynamics of the traditional RAID-5 scheme
and the new Diff-RAID scheme under different error patterns
and different array configurations. Our model provides a
useful tool for system designers to understand the reliability
of an SSD RAID array with regard to different scenarios.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1 in Section III-A
The computation of the system state in Equation (14) is
intuitive since the truncation point is Ul in interval (lsT, (l+
1)sT ). In the following, we focus on the derivation of the
error bound. Note that pi((l + 1)sT ) is the system state at
time (l+1)sT for the CTMC {X(t)}. Moreover, given the
state at time lsT , pi((l + 1)sT ) is computed iteratively by
computing pi((ls + 1)T ), pi((ls + 2)T ), ..., pi((ls + s)T )
sequentially. During each step, e.g., deriving pi((k + 1)T )
from pi(kT ) (ls ≤ k < (l + 1)s), uniformization is used.
Without loss of generality, we can let Λk = Λ˜l (ls ≤ k <
(l+1)s) as Λ˜l ≥ max0≤i≤S+1 |−qi,i(k)| for all k (ls ≤ k <
(l+1)s). Since Qk is denoted as the generator matrix of the
homogeneous CTMC {X(t), kT < t ≤ (k+1)T }, to apply
the uniformization, we let P k = I+QkΛ˜l (ls ≤ k < (l+1)s).Since every element of P k is a linear function of k, the
difference between two matrices P k+1 − P k must be the
same for all k, and we denote it by D. Formally, we have
D = P k+1 − P k, ls ≤ k < (l + 1)s (19)
Now, we can easily find that P k = P ls + (k − ls)D (ls ≤
k ≤ (l+ 1)s− 1). Moreover, since P˜ l = I + Q˜lΛ˜l and Q˜l is
defined as
∑(l+1)s−1
k=ls Qk
s
in Equation (11), we have
P˜ l =
∑(l+1)s−1
k=ls P k
s
=
∑(l+1)s−1
k=ls (P ls + (k − ls)D)
s
= P ls +
s− 1
2
D. (20)
Note that based on the analysis of {X(t), kT < t ≤ (k+
1)T } by using uniformization, pi((k+ 1)T ) (ls ≤ k < (l+
1)s) can be rewritten as follows.
pi((k + 1)T ) = pi(kT )e−Λ˜lT eΛ˜lTP k
= pi(kT )e−Λ˜lT eΛ˜lT (P ls+(k−ls)D).
Observe that most elements in the difference matrix D
are zero, and the non-zero elements are all very small, by
examining the elements in DP ls and the elements in P lsD,
we find that the multiplication of matrix D and matrix P ls
can be assumed to be commutative, or DP ls ≈ P lsD.
Therefore, we have
pi((l + 1)sT ) ≈ pi(lsT )e−Λ˜lsT eΛ˜lT
∑(l+1)s−1
k=ls P k
= pi(lsT )e−Λ˜lsT eΛ˜lTsP˜ l .
Now, the upper bound of the error ˆ˜ǫl is derived as follows.
ˆ˜ǫl=||ˆ˜pi((l + 1)sT )− pi((l + 1)sT )||1
=||ˆ˜pi(lsT )
Ul∑
n=0
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
P˜
n
l−pi(lsT )e
−Λ˜lsT eΛ˜lTsP˜ l||1
≤||ˆ˜pi(lsT )e−Λ˜lsT eΛ˜lsT P˜ l−pi(lsT )e−Λ˜lsT eΛ˜lTsP˜ l ||1
+||ˆ˜pi(lsT )
∞∑
n=Ul+1
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
P˜
n
l ||1
≤||ˆ˜pi(lsT )− pi(lsT )||1e
−Λ˜lsT eΛ˜lsT ||P˜ l||∞
+
(
1−
Ul∑
n=0
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
)
=ˆ˜ǫl−1 +
(
1−
Ul∑
n=0
e−Λ˜lsT
(Λ˜lsT )
n
n!
)
.
The last equation comes from the fact that ||P˜ l||∞ = 1 as
P˜ l = I +
Q˜
l
Λ˜l
, and ˆ˜ǫl−1 = ||ˆ˜pi(lsT )−pi(lsT )||1. Therefore,
we have the results stated in Theorem 1.
